

Summary

“Zur Normativität des Politischen in der säkularen, liberalen und sozialen Demokratie“

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Modern democracies are pluralistic insofar as they accept a plurality of conceptions of the good affirmed by their citizens. At the same time they depend on a public conception of justice and sustaining practices that are compatible with the fact of pluralism. Democracy without a shared normative idea of justice degenerates into an accidental association of disengaged individuals. But how can we justify the normative core of the liberal, secular and social democracy without falling back into monistic, universalistic or even ideological claims?

The problem of compatibility of democracy and pluralism is shortly sketched (I). Then a well-known and broadly accepted solution known as political liberalism is presented with respect to the work of John Rawls. For Rawls, a public conception of justice that might be supported by an overlapping consensus even in pluralistic democracies is to be ‘political, and not metaphysical’ (II) and also ‘reasonable, but not true’ (III). A discussion of this political liberalism, which is neither metaphysical nor ethical, follows. Eventually, five arguments against this ‘thin’ conception of liberalism are presented.